Review of Philosophy of Science Summarize judge?s conditions on science, present objections to his account on behalf of Thagard present an objection (to thagard?s account) that Newtonian mechanics does not count as a science based on this account, present a reply on behalf of Thagard Summarize Hempel?s model of explanation for individual events and his conditions of adequacy. Discuss one counter-example and a reply to it on his behalf What is Hempel?s basis for distinguishing between a law and a true accidental generalization? Explain Goodman?s objection, carefully defining the predicates he used and the way he deploys them What are Hanson?s 2 kinds of seeing and why does he think only one of them matters? Does Hanson?s account undermine the possibility of observation mediating between competing claims> if not why not, if so why so? What are two reasons why Putnam thinks observable, unobservable distinction does not coincide with the observable/theoretical distinction? If observation is not what matters for Putnam, what does he substitute in its place? What are quine?s conditions for a reconstrual of predicates to be successful? Why is Goodman?s problem not an instance of Quinje?s thesis? Explain why quine?s problems cant arise if I generalize from observed white swans to ?All swans are white? What is Fodor?s criticism of bridge laws? -Fodor argues that no such one on one type relation exists, fodor defends a weaker identity account that dispenses with bridge laws and makes due with token identity What is the difference between token identity and type identity How does Maxwell deal with the issue of in principle unobservables Putnam says that unobservable and theoretical entities are non co-extensive terms, give example As toulmin presents it, as theory develops, what stands do scientists take when it comes to the metaphysical status of theoretical entities? Ivan Tukhtin Ivantoukhtin@yahoo.com Espinar.firstname.lastname@example.org Jtrachte@eden.rutgers.edu Dcunha@eden.rutgers.edu Bretg@eden.rutgers.edu Spassova@eden.rutgers.edu Jesskoza@eden.rutgers.edu email@example.com 5. How can counterfactuals be deployed to distinguish laws from accidentalgeneralization? Explain why Lambert and Britten reject such an analysis. Howdo they propose to distinguish laws from accidental generalizations? Doestheir approach work?Here is the way I would answer the question:i. It is sometimes claimed that a distinguishing feature between laws andaccidental generalization is that the former but not the later supportcounterfactuals. As such a test for whether something is a law or not canmake use of this feature. ii. However, in doing so, one needs an account of counterfactuals - and onethat does not rely on laws.iii. However, L&B defend analyzing cf by way of laws.iv. They then go on to defend an account to distinguish laws form accidentalgeneralizations based on the formers systematic connection to "a largertheoretical framework".v. I argued that this comes down to saying something is a law if it is partof a set of laws.vi. But this then begs the question. How does Putnam feel about in principle unobservables?PUTNAM TAKES NO POSITION - HIS INTEREST IS IN THE DISITNCITON BETWEENTHEORETICAL STATEMENTS AND OBSERVAIOTN STATEMENTS NOT THEERETICAL ENTITITESAND OBERVANTONL ENTITITES - UNLIKE MAXWELL.2. What is Fodor's functional model of explanation?A FUNCTIONAL EXPLANAITON FOR HIM IS AN ACOCUNT OF WHAT A THING DOES AND HOWIT DOES IT. (E.G. A CAR ENGINE) HOW IT DOES IT IN THE SENSE OF BYBREAKING IT INTO ITS COMPONENT PARTS TO SHOW THE ROLE EACH PART PLAYS THEACCOUTN OF WHAT THE THINGS AS A WHOLE DOES.3. What is Fodor's criticism of Bridge Laws?FODOR ARGUES THAT NO SUCH 1-1 TYPE RELATION EXSITS. Fodor DEFENDS AN AWEAKER IDENTITY ACCOUNT THAT DISPENSES WITH BRIDGE LAWS AND MAKES DO WITHtoken identity. A FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION IS AN ACOCUNT OF WHAT A THING DOES AND HOW IT DOES IT. (E.G. A CAR ENGINE.) ?HOW IT DOES IT? IN THE SENSE OF BREAKING IT INTO ITS COMPONENT PARTS TO SHOW THE ROLE EACH PART PLAYS THE ACCOUNT OF WHAT THE THING AS A WHOLE DOES. I said, unlike a law, a generalization over a finite class of observationstatements can't generate the problem.And so too, Quine argues, even for a straightforward law that uses the samepredicates as the observation statements - even though it ranges over aninfinite number of observational. As I said in memos I elaborated to the class - the problem only arises ifthe predicates of the law ranges over an assortment of predicates.
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