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What law does McNeil accuse Pfizer of violating in this case?
A. Fairness in Advertising Act.
B. Lanham Act.
C. Trade Libel Law.
D. Federal Trade Commission Act.
Of the two studies that Pfizer conducted on the effect of Listerine on plaque
A. the Sharma study showed Listerine as effective as floss but the Bauroth study did not.
B. the Bauroth study showed Listerine as effective as floss but the Sharma study did not.
C. both studies showed Listerine as effective as floss.
D. neither study showed Listerine as effective as floss.
McNeil’s surveys on the message consumers take away from the Big Bang ad found
A. a significant percentage of respondents believed Listerine can replace flossing.
B. few respondents believed Listerine could replace floss.
C. inconclusive results.
The McNeil court said the plaintiff, to establish an ad contains a false implication, must show that the implication was taken away by at least what percentage of the audience?
A. 50 percent
B. 40 percent
C. 30 percent
D. 20 percent
Which of the following is NOT a practice that the FTC has found misleading or deceptive?
A. Failure to meet warranty obligations.
B. Using words like “best” or “greatest” without empirical evidence to back up those claims.
C. Misleading price claims.
D. Failure to disclose information regarding pyramid sales.
In cases of implied claims, the FTC will often be able to determine meaning through all of the following except
A. the juxtaposition of various phrases in the document.
B. the nature of the claim.
C. the nature of the transaction.
D. the nature of the market in which the product is sold.
When an advertisement targets a specific group, such as children, the FTC will determine its effect on
A. the majority of people in that group.
B. the least sophisticated members of that group.
C. a reasonable member of that group.
D. a naïve member of that group.
To be considered deceptive, an advertising claim must be material. The FTC defines “material” as a representation or practice that is
A. likely to affect a consumer’s choice regarding that product.
B. describes a tangible aspect of that product.
C. that refers to an objectively measurable quality of that product.
The Federal Trade Commission defines “advertising” as any action, method or device
A. that offers to sell goods or services.
B. that was paid for by someone offering to sell goods or services.
C. that draws the attention of the public to goods, services, people or organizations.
D. communicated through mass media and drawing attention to a company.
The enforcement tool most commonly used by the FTC is
A. corrective advertising.
B. consent agreements.
C. trade regulation rules.
If an advertiser fails to abide by a consent agreement or a litigated order, it can expect the FTC will
A. seek prison sentences for the advertiser’s executives.
B. impose fines on the advertiser.
C. enjoin the advertiser from doing business in the U.S.
D. require the advertiser to get prior approval of all future advertising.
Which of the following is NOT a factor the FTC considers when determining what constitutes a reasonable basis for a claim?
A. The type of claim.
B. The consequences of a false claim.
C. The benefits of a truthful claim.
D. The likelihood that the average person will believe the claim.
Firms are not responsible for possessing substantiation for implied claims they do not believe their ad makes, even though the implication may be a reasonable one.
The FTC expects that advertisers will have substantiation for their claims
A. after the advertisements have been published.
B. at the time the advertisements are published.
C. before the advertisements are published.
The FTC will always defer to the judgment of self-regulatory groups on matters of substantiation of advertising claims.
Originally, 18 U.S.C. Section 1304 prohibited radio or television broadcast by any licensed station of
A. any advertisements or information containing the word “gambling.”
B. any advertisements with illustrations of people gambling.
C. any advertisements or information concerning casino gambling.
D. any advertisements or information about lotteries or games of chance.
Which of the following standards does the court apply to resolve the First Amendment issue in this case?
A. The Brandenburg test.
B. The O’Brien test.
C. The Central Hudson test.
D. The Shulman standard.
Which of the following is an interest the government claimed it was upholding in this case?
A. Reducing the social costs of gambling.
B. Protecting Native American casinos.
C. Preventing the economic “border bleed” associated with people traveling from states without gambling to states with gambling.
D. Protecting public lotteries from competition with casinos.
The Supreme Court said the ban on casino advertising failed to directly advance the government’s interest because
A. people are going to gamble no matter whether it is advertised.
B. there was no reason to believe advertising led to compulsive gambling.
C. exceptions to the ban on advertising made the regulation ineffective.
D. commercial casinos are already heavily regulated.
Which of the following is NOT an action the FCC may take to enforce its rules on indecency?
A. Revoke a broadcast station license.
B. Impose a monetary forfeiture.
C. Issue a warning to the broadcaster.
D. Sentence a broadcaster to prison time.
The FCC limits indecency to certain subject matter. Which of the following best describes that subject matter?
A. Sexual activity and violence.
B. Nudity and profanity.
C. Excretory organs and violence.
D. Sexual or excretory organs or activity.
The FCC says that “indecency” includes
A. any material concerning sexual or excretory activity or organs.
B. any patently offensive material dealing with sexual or excretory activity or organs.
C. any highly detailed information about sexual activity or excretory organs.
D. only visual representations of sexual or excretory activity or organs.
The FCC says “patent offensiveness” must be judged by
A. the standards of the local community in which the broadcast airs.
B. contemporary national community standards for the broadcast medium.
C. the standards set by a panel of experts.
D. what would be psychologically disturbing to children.
The FCC identifies three factors it will use for determining patent offensiveness. Which of the following is NOT one of them.
A. Late night vs. prime-time broadcast.
B. Explicitness vs. indirectness.
C. Repetition vs. fleeting reference.
D. Pandering or titillating manner.
Material that is indecent may be broadcast
A. after 10 p.m. and before 6 a.m.
B. between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.
C. after 6 a.m. and before 10 p.m.
D. on Saturdays and Sundays.
This case arose after the FCC changed its position on
A. explicit versus implicit references to sexual or excretory activities or organs.
B. repetition versus fleeting appearances of offensive language or images.
C. the presentation of sexual material in a pandering manner.
D. the duration of the safe harbor for indecent material.
The Supreme Court said the FCC failed to
A. explain why the words used in the Golden Globe Award shows were indecent.
B. define what it meant by “indecency.”
C. give broadcasters adequate notice that fleeting expletives could be indecent.
D. give broadcasters a hearing before the full commission.
The Supreme Court said that because it decided the case on fair-notice grounds it
A. implicitly found the FCC regulations contrary to the First Amendment.
B. implicitly found the FCC regulations compatible with the First Amendment.
C. explicitly found the FCC regulations violated the First Amendment.
D. did not need to address the First Amendment question.
To which of the four major components of the Internet did the FCC’s Open Internet Order (OIO) apply?
A. Backbone networks.
B. Broadband providers.
C. Edge providers.
D. End users.
The FCC’s OIO imposed three requirements on broadband providers. Which of the following is not one of them?
A. Disclosure of network practices and terms.
B. Prohibition on blocking competing applications.
C. Prohibitions on unreasonable discrimination on edge providers.
D. Assure equal opportunity for all points of view.
The appeals court held that
A. the FCC has the statutory authority to issue the OIO and it is likely to have the desired effect.
B. the FCC had statutory authority to issue the OIO but the rule will not have the desired effect.
C. the OIO will have the desired effect, the FCC lacks statutory authority to issue it.
The appeals court struck down the FCC’s OIO because it
A. required broadband providers to offer service to all end users.
B. imposed common carrier obligations on broadband providers.
C. discriminated among broadband providers on the basis of the signals they carry.
D. violated the First Amendment rights of broadband providers.
Daniel Becker wanted to run commercials for his election to
A. the U.S. Senate.
B. the U.S. House of Representatives.
C. the Georgia governorship.
D. the Georgia Legislature.
After Becker sought to purchase time on an Atlanta TV station, the station asked the FCC to let it
A. run Becker’s spot only between midnight and 6 a.m.
B. refuse to run the spot at any time.
C. charge Becker an additional fee for handling viewer complaints.
D. demand that Becker change his spot before airing it.
The court of appeals held that channeling Becker’s ad to late night
A. did not violate Sec. 312(a)(7) because he still had access to airtime.
B. did violate Sec. 312(a)(7) because it denied him broad audience potential.
C. did not violate Sec. 312(a)(7) because he still controlled his message.
D. did violate Sec. 312(a)(7) because he has a right to reach children.
In ruling on Becker’s Sec. 315 (equal opportunity claim) the appeals court said channeling the ad to late night
A. still allowed him to buy as much time as he wanted.
B. protected children from indecent material.
C. amounted to censorship of Becker’s ads.
Maker’s Mark alleged Diageo infringed on its trademark by using
A. a name similar to its own.
B. a bottle shaped like its own.
C. a dripping-wax seal like its own.
D. a logo like its own.
Diageo contended that Maker’s Mark could not claim a trademark in the dripping-wax seal because
A. it is a functional element, essential to the product.
B. Diageo had already claimed it as a mark.
C. it was not distinctive enough to qualify for protection.
D. the idea did not originate with Maker’s Mark.
The court said that of the various factors used in testing for confusion of marks, the one that most heavily favored Maker’s Mark was
A. Diageo’s intent.
B. evidence of actual confusion.
C. likely degree of purchaser care.
D. the strength of the mark.
Levi Strauss is suing Abercrombie & Fitch for _____________ its trademark.
The trial court had ruled in favor of Abercrombie & Fitch because
A. the two pocket designs were completely dissimilar.
B. the Levi Strauss design was not registered as a trademark.
C. the two marks were not identical or nearly identical.
D. Levi Strauss failed to show its mark was distinctive.
The appeals court reversed the trial court because the Trademark Dilution Revision Act abandoned the “identical or nearly identical” standard for dilution cases.
Which of the following best describes the situation presented by Brown v. Perdue?
A. Brown alleges Perdue infringed on his copyrights.
B. Perdue alleges Brown infringed on his copyrights.
C. Brown is suing for a declaration that he did NOT infringe on Perdue’s copyrights.
D. Perdue is suing for a declaration that he did NOT infringe on Brown’s copyrights.
The trial judge said the key issue is whether there is a substantial similarity between the two works, meaning a
A. literary expert would recognize the alleged copy as appropriated from the original.
B. lay person would recognize the alleged copy as appropriated from the original.
C. literary expert would find the two works nearly identical.
D. lay person would find the two works nearly identical.
The trial judge said that many of the similarities between the two works were of
A. facts, themes and ideas that cannot be copyrighted.
B. expressive elements that cannot be copyrighted.
C. facts, themes and ideas that can be copyrighted.
D. expressive elements that can be copyrighted.
After looking at thematic expression; total concept and feel; plot; characters; and sequence, pace and setting, the trial judge found
A. substantial similarity in three of the five.
B. substantial similarity in all of the five.
C. substantial similarity in only one of the five.
D. substantial similarity in none of the five.
The district court said 2 Live Crew made fair use of “Oh, Pretty Woman,” but the appeals court reversed because the parody
A. was not sufficiently different from the original.
B. was a commercial use and presumptively unfair.
C. used too much of the original.
D. Harmed the market for the original.
On the issue of the commercial nature of the parody, the Supreme Court said
A. a commercial use of copyrighted work can never be fair.
B. the commercial nature of the use is of no importance in determining fair use.
C. whether a use is commercial is only one factor in determining fair use.
D. the commercial nature matters only when the infringer’s profits are large.
According to the Supreme Court, the first fair-use factor (the purpose and character of the use) primarily asks whether the new work is
The Supreme Court said “Oh, Pretty Woman” is highly creative and expressive and deserving copyright protection;
A. therefore, the plaintiffs are entitled to damages.
B. however, the use is presumptively fair.
C. therefore, 2 Live Crew may use as much as it wants.
D. however, parodies always copy highly creative and expressive works.
For a parody to make fair use of a copyrighted work it may take
A. enough to conjure up the original.
B. no more than 30 percent of the original.
C. the heart of the original.
D. as much of the original as the parodist considers necessary.
The California Supreme Court said the tort of intrusion has two elements:
A. 1) intrusion into a private place and 2) at least minor annoyance to the plaintiff.
B. 1) intrusion into private or public matters that would be 2) highly offensive to a reasonable person.
C. 1) intrusion into a private place 2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.
The court said the mere presence of the Group W cameraman at the scene of the accident
A. did not constitute intrusion.
B. would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
C. clearly intruded in a private place.
D. was an intrusion but was protected under the First Amendment.
The court said that whether the recording of Shulman’s conversations with the nurse at the accident scene was intrusion depended on
A. how deeply offended Shulman was.
B. how deeply offended a reasonable viewer would be.
C. whether Shulman knew she was being recorded.
D. whether Shulman had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.
In regard to the offensiveness of any intrusion, the court said
A. the cameraman’s conduct was not offensive.
B. a reasonable person in Shulman’s place would not be offended.
C. merely photographing an accident scene is offensive.
D. a reasonable jury could find Group W’s conduct highly offensive.
The court said the First Amendment protections for news gathering are
A. stronger than those for publication.
B. as strong as those for publication.
C. weaker than those for publication.
Glik was charged with
A. assaulting a police officer and disturbing the peace.
B. violating the state wiretap statute and disturbing the peace.
C. disturbing the peace and causing a riot.
D. violating the state wiretap statute and selling illegal drugs.
The defendant police officers claimed “qualified immunity,” meaning
A. immunity from prosecution for anyone arrested while exercising constitutional rights.
B. immunity for police officers who violate the constitutional rights of a citizen.
C. immunity for public officials from personal liability for actions taken performing official duties in some cases.
The appeals court said Glik’s arrest
A. violated his First Amendment rights and the fact he was not a news reporter was irrelevant.
B. violated his First Amendment rights but the fact he was not a news reporter barred his lawsuit.
C. did not violate his First Amendment rights.
Glik claimed the police had violated his Fourth Amendment rights because they
A. did not have a warrant to seize his cellphone.
B. did not have a warrant to arrest him.
C. did not have probable cause to believe he was photographing the officers.
D. did not have probable cause to believe he was secretly recording audio.
The appeals court said Glik’s open use of a cellphone was
A. sufficient evidence for inferring the officers knew they were being recorded.
B. evidence the officers knew they were being photographed but not that their words were being recorded.
C. insufficient evidence that the officers were subjectively aware of being recorded.
The coroner’s inquest into Marilyn Sheppard’s murder was
A. closed to the public.
B. held in a courtroom open to the public.
C. held in a school gymnasium but closed to the news media.
D. held in a school gymnasium and broadcast over radio and television.
Police and prosecutors leaked to the press allegations of several extramarital affairs by Sam Sheppard and of a trail of blood from the bedroom downstairs. Evidence of these was
A. introduced at Sheppard’s trial.
B. never introduced at Sheppard’s trial.
C. offered at the trial but not admitted by the judge.
D. introduced at the trial but rebutted by the defense.
The names and addresses of the 75 veniremen, from whom the jurors were selected, were
A. kept secret from the prosecutors and the defense attorneys.
B. kept secret from the defense attorneys but known to the prosecutors.
C. disclosed to the media with a promise they be kept confidential.
D. published in all of the local newspapers.
For Sheppard’s trial, almost all of the seats in the courtroom were assigned to
A. relatives of Sam and Marilyn Sheppard.
B. the general public on a first-come, first-served basis.
C. the news media.
D. prosecution and defense witnesses.
During Sam Sheppard’s trial, the jurors were
B. not sequestered but admonished not to read or talk about the case.
C. not sequestered but encouraged to discuss the case with friends.
D. sequestered but encouraged to discuss the case among themselves.
Which of the following best describes the Supreme Court’s view of news coverage of criminal trials?
A. It guards against miscarriages of justice by police, prosecutors and judges.
B. It almost always prejudices jurors against defendants.
C. It almost always prejudices jurors against the prosecution.
D. It has no effect on trials, good or bad.
The Supreme Court suggested several things the trial judge could have done to protect Sheppard’s right to a fair trial. Which of the following is NOT one of them?
A. Insulating witnesses from the press.
B. Limiting the release of information by police and attorneys.
C. Ordering reporters to withhold prejudicial information.
D. Moving the trial to another community.
Which of the following is among the information that IS generally appropriate for disclosure?
A. The existence or contents of a confession.
B. Opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused.
C. The amount or conditions of bail.
D. The results of any tests or examinations.
Which of the following is among the information that IS NOT generally appropriate for disclosure?
A. The name, age, residence and similar information about the accused.
B. Statements concerning the credibility of any witnesses.
C. The identity of the complainant or victim.
D. Any physical evidence seized at the time of arrest.
Which of the following is NOT true about an accused’s prior criminal record?
A. Police should release it only to aid in the apprehension of a suspect.
B. The information is not considered public record.
C. Publication of an accused’s prior criminal record can prejudice potential jurors.
Which of the following is NOT appropriate in taking or releasing photos of suspects?
A. Deliberately posing a suspect for photographs.
B. Taking unposed photographs as a suspect enters or leaves a courtroom.
C. Releasing to the news media photos of suspects or accused people.
The initial gag order issued by the county court prohibited the release for public dissemination of
A. the suspect’s name and address.
B. the victims’ names and addresses.
C. any testimony or evidence given at the preliminary hearing.
D. the names of the arresting officers.
Which of the following is NOT among the things the district court prohibited the media from publishing?
A. The existence or contents of any confession Simants had made.
B. The contents of a note Simants had written the night of the crime.
C. The victims and nature of alleged sexual assaults.
D. The weapon used to kill the victims.
The Nebraska Supreme Court narrowed the gag order to
A. any confession to police, any confession to parties other than the press and any facts strongly implicative of the accused.
B. any medical testimony, any confession to police and any confession to parties other than the press.
C. any confession to police, any ballistics evidence any facts strongly implicative of the accused.
By the time this case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, Simants had been
A. convicted, sentenced to death and executed.
B. acquitted on grounds of insanity.
C. convicted and sentenced to death with an appeal pending.
D. acquitted on grounds of insanity with an appeal by the state pending.
The U.S. Supreme Court described the gag order in this case as a
A. reasonable time, place and manner regulation.
B. prior restraint.
C. punishment for irresponsible news reporting.
D. minor irritation to the news media.
The Supreme Court said prior cases showed that pre-trial publicity
A. inevitably leads to an unfair trial.
B. leads to an unfair trial more often than not.
C. has almost no effect on the fairness of a trial.
D. does not inevitably lead to an unfair trial.
The Supreme Court said prior restraints may be imposed if a trial judge has evidence regarding all but which of the following?
A. The nature and extent of the publicity.
B. Whether the news coverage is accurate or inaccurate.
C. Whether other measures would protect the fairness of the trial.
D. Whether a prior restraint would be effective.
Which of the following is NOT among the alternatives to a prior restraint mentioned by the U.S. Supreme Court?
A. Closure of the courtroom.
B. Change of venue.
C. Postponement of the trial.
D. Searching questioning of potential jurors.
The Supreme Court said the gag order in Simants’ case failed to meet constitutional standards because
A. the nature and extent of the publicity did not threaten to prejudice the trial.
B. the judge had evidence that alternatives would not work but not that a prior restraint would work.
C. the judge lacked evidence that alternatives would not work and that a prior restraint would.
C. the judge lacked evidence that alternatives would not work and that a prior restraint would.
The California trial court in the murder trial of Robert Diaz closed to the press and public and sealed the transcript of
A. the entire trial.
B. the grand jury proceedings.
C. the preliminary hearing.
D. the petit jury deliberations.
To decide whether a First Amendment right of access exists to a particular type of proceeding, the Supreme Court asks:
A. Is there a tradition of access and would access prejudice this individual’s case?
B. Is there a tradition of access and does public access play a positive role?
C. Does public access play a positive role but would it prejudice this individual’s case?
The Supreme Court said public access to preliminary hearings plays a positive role because
A. in the absence of a jury, public scrutiny protects fairness.
B. the publicity helps the public feel as if the police and courts are doing their job.
C. the preliminary hearing is largely a formality.
D. the preliminary hearing is a rehearsal for the inevitable trial.
The public’s right of access to a court proceeding can be abridged if the judge finds
A. a substantial probability access would be a nuisance and closure would be effective in protecting fairness.
B. a substantial probability alternatives to closure would be ineffective and access would be inconvenient for the court.
C. a substantial probability of prejudice to the trial that closure would prevent and that alternatives would not be effective.
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